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fix(codex): bypass internal sandbox in CI to unbreak diff inspection #23
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LLM trust-boundary violation — potential secret exfiltration
The sandbox being removed here was doing double duty: not just containing
bwrapstartup failures, but also acting as the OS-level containment boundary for whatever shell commands Codex decides to run after reading untrusted PR content.$PROMPTis assembled at line 68:PROMPT="Review the changes on this branch against origin/${BASE_REF} for regressions in the PR titled '${PR_TITLE}'.PR_TITLEcomes fromgithub.event.pull_request.title— fully controlled by the PR author. A title like:gives Codex (an agent that autonomously shells out) an injected instruction. With the sandbox in place, the outbound network call was blocked. With
--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox, it completes — exfiltrating theOPENAI_API_KEYthat was written to~/.codex/auth.jsonat the login step.$GITHUB_TOKENis in the environment too.The PR's "net trust unchanged" claim is only true for workflow code, which is authored by trusted maintainers. Codex is an LLM agent processing untrusted PR content, which is a different threat model. The sandbox was the boundary between those two.
Suggested mitigations (pick one or combine):
PR_TITLEbefore building$PROMPT.PR_TITLEto a temp file and have Codex read it; reduces prompt-injection surface.iptablesdrop except GitHub/OpenAI endpoints) so even if injection succeeds the exfil call fails.--sandbox danger-full-accesswas tested but dismissed;--no-sandbox(if available in a newer codex-cli version) might also work without the bwrap netns setup.