Data carries its own proof of integrity, intrinsically.
IPLD-native content addressing for Rust and Python. A content address is derived from the data itself, not assigned by an authority — give someone the bytes and the address, and they can recompute the address and know, with no trusted third party, that the bytes are exactly what the address names. The proof travels with the data.
This crate is deliberately small and honest: it is the instrument, not the sky.
It speaks the multiformats / IPLD stack, so its artifacts interoperate with the wider content-addressed world (IPFS, IPLD, libp2p). Every id is a CIDv1 with a fixed profile:
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CID version | v1 |
| Codec | DAG-CBOR (0x71) |
| Multihash | BLAKE3 (0x1e) |
| Digest | 32 bytes |
| Encoding | canonical DAG-CBOR (strict key order, definite lengths, tag-42 links) |
Rust is the core implementation; the Python package is a PyO3 binding over that same Rust core, so an id computed in Python is byte-identical to the one Rust computes for the same canonical IPLD value.
The package is 0.1.0 — the first release that freezes the core contract.
The core byte/wire and API contracts are locked for the whole 0.1.x line
(changing any is a breaking release outside 0.1.x), while the optional
unstable-merkle / unstable-store features are explicitly still moving and are
named to say so.
| Surface | Default | Stability |
|---|---|---|
ContentId, canonical encoding, core errors, presentation, MSRV |
Yes | Frozen for 0.1.x — changing any is a breaking release outside 0.1.x |
| Python core parity | Separate package | Same core byte profile |
unstable-merkle feature |
No | Experimental — serialized node bytes NOT frozen |
unstable-store feature |
No | Experimental — trait/API surface NOT frozen (no new wire format of its own) |
Details and rationale: docs/STABILITY.md.
Rust:
[dependencies]
content-addressable = "0.1.0"With the optional (default-off) features:
content-addressable = { version = "0.1.0", features = ["unstable-merkle"] }
content-addressable = { version = "0.1.0", features = ["unstable-store"] }
content-addressable = { version = "0.1.0", features = ["unstable-merkle", "unstable-store"] }Python:
pip install content-addressableThe PyPI distribution is content-addressable (hyphen); the import name is
content_addressable (underscore):
import content_addressableImplement ContentAddressable by providing canonical_form; content_id,
verify, and ensure_content_id come for free:
use content_addressable::{canonical, ContentAddressable, ContentError};
use serde::Serialize;
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct Record {
name: String,
}
impl ContentAddressable for Record {
fn canonical_form(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ContentError> {
canonical::to_canonical_dagcbor(self)
}
}
let record = Record { name: "alpha".into() };
let id = record.content_id()?; // a CIDv1 (DAG-CBOR + BLAKE3)
assert!(record.verify(&id)?); // self-certifying: re-derive and compare
println!("{id}"); // "bafyr4i…" — the canonical text form
# Ok::<(), ContentError>(())verify returns Ok(false) on a mismatch; its strict sibling
ensure_content_id returns Err(ContentError::VerificationFailed) instead. The
secondary digest and binary presentation forms are in
Presentation forms.
The Python face exposes the same byte profile, but not the Rust
ContentAddressable trait or verify — you canonicalize a native Python value
and take its content_id directly. This block is mirrored by
tests/test_readme.py (every call identical), so CI's python job proves it
still works:
from content_addressable import (
ContentId, content_id,
to_canonical_dagcbor, from_canonical_dagcbor,
)
# A value's content id (CIDv1, DAG-CBOR + BLAKE3). Key order is irrelevant.
record = {"name": "alpha", "attrs": {}}
cid = content_id(record)
assert str(cid).startswith("b") # base32-lower multibase text
assert len(cid.digest_hex()) == 64 # 64-char bare-digest-hex
assert isinstance(to_canonical_dagcbor(record), bytes)
# Canonical bytes round-trip; equal values -> equal bytes -> equal ids.
raw = to_canonical_dagcbor(record)
assert content_id(record) == ContentId.from_canonical_bytes(raw)
assert from_canonical_dagcbor(raw) == record
assert content_id({"attrs": {}, "name": "alpha"}) == cid # order-independent
# Parse an id back from its text / binary forms.
assert ContentId.parse(str(cid)) == cid
assert ContentId.from_bytes(cid.to_bytes()) == cid
# Wrap an already-computed 32-byte BLAKE3 digest with NO re-hash.
assert ContentId.from_blake3_content_digest(cid.digest_bytes()) == cid
assert len(cid.digest_bytes()) == 32 # the raw BLAKE3 hashContentId implements __eq__ / __hash__, so an id is usable as a dict key
or set member.
Prefer the safe path. from_canonical_bytes is fast but carries a real
precondition — it is not universally safe.
| Use case | API (Rust / Python) | Contract |
|---|---|---|
| Hash a normal value | value.content_id() / content_id(value) |
Preferred safe path |
| Encode a value to bytes | canonical::to_canonical_dagcbor(v) / to_canonical_dagcbor(v) |
Produces canonical DAG-CBOR |
| Accept foreign / untrusted bytes | Rust: ContentId::from_canonical_bytes_checked(b) · Python: no single checked constructor yet |
Validates DAG-CBOR canonicality; errors on non-canonical |
| Hash already-trusted canonical bytes | ContentId::from_canonical_bytes(b) |
Unchecked precondition: caller asserts b is canonical DAG-CBOR |
| Wrap an existing BLAKE3 digest | ContentId::from_blake3_content_digest(d) |
No rehash; caller asserts the digest is BLAKE3 over canonical DAG-CBOR |
A ContentId names four distinct presentation forms so callers can't confuse
them; each is frozen (changing any is a breaking release outside 0.1.x):
| Form | Rust | Python | What it is |
|---|---|---|---|
| Canonical text | Display / to_string() |
str(id) |
multibase base32-lower (b…) — the IPLD-canonical CID string |
| Binary envelope | to_bytes() / from_bytes() |
to_bytes() / from_bytes() |
the full CID binary form (version + codec + multihash + digest) |
| Bare digest | digest_bytes() -> [u8; 32] |
digest_bytes() -> bytes |
the raw 32-byte BLAKE3 hash, no envelope |
| Bare-digest-hex | digest_hex() -> String |
digest_hex() -> str |
lower-hex of the 32-byte digest (64 chars, no prefix) |
Display is the inverse of FromStr for base32-lower, and that round-trip is
frozen and tested. Full CID bytes can be hex-encoded by a caller directly
(hex::encode(id.to_bytes())) — the crate deliberately does not bless a second
"hex" method; see docs/STABILITY.md for why.
Both features are default-off and exercised in CI via --all-features. Do
not depend on the unstable-merkle node bytes yet.
MerkleNode<T> is a payload: T plus parents: BTreeSet<ContentId>; its id is
derived from both the payload and the parent links, so a root id plus the
node bytes determines the whole DAG. Because parents are a BTreeSet, they are
deduplicated and ordered by content-derived Ord — equal parent sets always
produce equal bytes regardless of insertion order, and each parent serializes as
a real DAG-CBOR tag-42 link.
use content_addressable::merkle::MerkleNode; // feature = "unstable-merkle"
let root = MerkleNode::genesis("hello");
let root_id = root.id()?;
let child = MerkleNode::new("world", [root_id]);
assert!(child.parents().contains(&root_id));
# Ok::<(), content_addressable::ContentError>(())The serialized node layout is experimental and NOT frozen — pinning it
(Merkle conformance vectors) is post-0.1.0 work.
A narrow, backend-agnostic seam: get/put by ContentId, with a verified
read path the extension-trait implementation establishes. The pieces:
NodeStore— the raw backend seam (two dumb ops:get_unverified,insert). Backends implement only this.NodeStoreExt— blanket-implemented, sealed-by-coherence verified operations (get,get_node,put,put_checked, …). A backend cannot re-implement them.VerifiedStore<B>— the recommended capability-safe facade: it exposes only the verified operations (dispatched via UFCS), so a backend's own inherent method cannot intercept a call made through it. Use this unless you have a reason to drop to raw ops.MemoryStore— the grow-only in-memory reference backend.AddressedBytes— an unforgeable, address-consistent(id, bytes)pair; it is the only thinginsertaccepts, so a backend can't be handed a mismatched pair.
Typed writes/reads are the strict doors:
use content_addressable::store::{MemoryStore, VerifiedStore};
use content_addressable::{canonical, ContentAddressable, ContentError};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct Record {
name: String,
}
impl ContentAddressable for Record {
fn canonical_form(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ContentError> {
canonical::to_canonical_dagcbor(self)
}
}
let mut store = VerifiedStore::new(MemoryStore::new());
let record = Record { name: "alpha".into() };
let id = store.put_node(&record)?; // strict: rejects non-canonical
let recovered: Record = store.get_node(&id)?; // identity-preserving typed read
assert_eq!(record, recovered);
# Ok::<(), content_addressable::store::StoreError>(())put_nodestrictly validates canonical DAG-CBOR before insertion;putis unchecked with respect to canonicality (put_checked/put_nodeare the strict doors).get_nodeperforms an identity-preserving typed read (decode, re-encode, and require the value to be the one named by the id). Rawgetproves only that the returned bytes hash to the requested CID — not that they are canonical.
Trust boundary. The seam derives addresses on write and verifies them on read
(seam theorems). Successful persistence, durability, no-rebind, and grow-only
behavior are backend obligations (backend refinement laws), not seam
theorems — MemoryStore discharges its documented in-memory obligations. The
formal Lean/TLA+ artifacts are deferred proof targets (tracked in
#71); the store
module docs in src/store.rs carry the full proof-obligation
catalog. The store trait/API is experimental and NOT frozen.
The frozen 0.1.x contracts — CID profile, presentation, serde representation,
error policy, verify/ensure_content_id, crate-root exports, MSRV/edition, the
no-rehash digest bridge, and the experimental-feature exclusions — are recorded
in docs/STABILITY.md, with issue provenance. Treat the
frozen surfaces as durable.
just check # the local gate: fmt + clippy + test + docs + leaf-depsA pre-push hook runs the same checks; the individual cargo fmt / cargo clippy
/ cargo test --all-features steps work directly too.
Tag-driven; see RELEASING.md for the wheel matrix, PyPI Trusted
Publishing, and crates.io steps.
Apache-2.0.