chore: harden workflows and add a security policy - #32
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Signed-off-by: Francois Gouteroux <[email protected]>
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Addresses the three OpenSSF Scorecard checks that were scoring 0 and could be
fixed without changing how the project is maintained.
Verified by re-running Scorecard against this branch:
All three previously scored 0.
Token permissions
release.ymldeclaredcontents: writeat the workflow level, so every step inthe workflow ran with a token that could write to the repository. The workflow
now defaults to
contents: read, andwriteis granted only on thegoreleaserjob, which needs it to publish the release.
ci.yamlalready hadcontents: read.Pinned actions
The seven action references are pinned to commit SHAs, with the tag kept as a
trailing comment for readability. A mutable tag can be repointed at new code by
whoever controls the action repository; a SHA cannot.
The trade-off is that pinned actions no longer pick up updates on their own. The
github-actionsDependabot group added earlier resolves SHAs, so updates willstill arrive as pull requests.
Security policy
Adds
SECURITY.md, pointing at GitHub private vulnerability reporting ratherthan a public issue. The scope section is specific to what this project handles:
API authentication, private keys and token values including in logs, issuance
for domains the requester does not own, path traversal through certificate or
owner names, and cluster-level trust between nodes.
Not addressed
Four checks stay at 0 because they are workflow or infrastructure decisions
rather than fixes:
Code-Review(approved changesets),Branch-Protection,Signed-Releases(cosign in GoReleaser) andFuzzing.Note also that no score is published for this repository yet —
api.scorecard.devreturns 404, and the badge renders as "invalid repo path". Publishing requires
the
ossf/scorecard-actionworkflow withpublish_results: trueandid-token: write, which is deliberately left out of this PR.