Update dependency io.netty:netty-codec-http2 to v4.1.135.Final [SECURITY] (master) - autoclosed - #11074
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This PR contains the following updates:
4.1.133.Final→4.1.135.FinalWarning
Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the warning logs for more information.
Netty HTTP/2: Advertised MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS are not enforced
CVE-2026-47244 / GHSA-5x3r-wrvg-rp6q
More information
Details
Impact
DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work.
Resources
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7540.html#section-6.5.2
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
netty-codec-http2: ByteBuf Reference-Count Leak in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener Leads to Memory Exhaustion
CVE-2026-48043 / GHSA-c2gf-v879-257j
More information
Details
Impact
The
DelegatingDecompressorFrameListenerclass orchestrates HTTP/2 decompression by embedding a per-streamEmbeddedChannelthat runs the appropriate decompression codec (gzip, deflate, zstd) and forwards decompressed chunks to a wrapped listener. Each decompressed chunk is a pooledByteBufhanded to an anonymousChannelInboundHandlerAdaptertail handler, which becomes the sole owner responsible for releasing it.A remote peer could send frames that would result in the flow-controller throwing and so trigger a resource leak which at the end might take down the whole JVM due OOME.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature
CVE-2026-50560 / GHSA-563q-j3cm-6jxm
More information
Details
Summary
Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.
Details
There is a setting in the http2 specification called
SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE. According to the RFC: “This advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.”When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:
Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.
Remediation
When speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as “advisory” and ignore it. It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.
Impact
This is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.
Credit
Jonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)
Contact
Ashley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - [email protected]
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature
CVE-2026-50560 / GHSA-563q-j3cm-6jxm
More information
Details
Summary
Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.
Details
There is a setting in the http2 specification called
SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE. According to the RFC: “This advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.”When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:
Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.
Remediation
When speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as “advisory” and ignore it. It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.
Impact
This is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.
Credit
Jonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)
Contact
Ashley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - [email protected]
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Netty HTTP/2: Advertised MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS are not enforced
CVE-2026-47244 / GHSA-5x3r-wrvg-rp6q
More information
Details
Impact
DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work.
Resources
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7540.html#section-6.5.2
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
netty-codec-http2: ByteBuf Reference-Count Leak in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener Leads to Memory Exhaustion
CVE-2026-48043 / GHSA-c2gf-v879-257j
More information
Details
Impact
The
DelegatingDecompressorFrameListenerclass orchestrates HTTP/2 decompression by embedding a per-streamEmbeddedChannelthat runs the appropriate decompression codec (gzip, deflate, zstd) and forwards decompressed chunks to a wrapped listener. Each decompressed chunk is a pooledByteBufhanded to an anonymousChannelInboundHandlerAdaptertail handler, which becomes the sole owner responsible for releasing it.A remote peer could send frames that would result in the flow-controller throwing and so trigger a resource leak which at the end might take down the whole JVM due OOME.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
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