feat(neo): native ~/.senpi store readers + neo.theme write path (neo-go-tui task 4)

[code-yeongyu]

Summary

Plan task 4 of .omo/plans/neo-go-tui.md: native Go readers for the ~/.senpi store (settings, keybindings, sessions, models, auth presence, themes) plus the lock-replicating settings write path the neo TUI persists its skin through. Additive only, packages/neo internal.

Changes

• internal/store: agent-dir resolution (env derived from AppName, mirroring config.ts — a pi build reads PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR/.pi), settings global+project merge (project wins), keybindings reader, sessions scanner (safe-path dirs, <timestamp>_<id>.jsonl, header+entry parsing sufficient for the picker, corrupted-line skip-with-warning), models.json, auth presence/type map only, custom themes listing.
• settings_write.go: replicates FileSettingsStorage.withLock (same lockfile path + retry semantics; read-current → merge only neo fields → write; never whole-file overwrite); persists neo.theme as a separate key — classic theme is never written.
• qaharness/writeqa: manual-QA driver commands.

QA / Evidence

Evidence: .omo/evidence/task-4-neo-go-tui.txt (+ task-4-qa/) in the work worktree.

• 35+ table tests incl. a concurrent-writer race test (Go writer vs simulated classic writer) — green under -race; corrupted-JSONL fixture skipped, not fatal.
• Manual QA: sandbox copy of a real sessions tree — picker data matches ls ground truth (machine-checked report); missing agent dir → clean defaults, no crash; real ~/.senpi/agent/auth.json sha256 identical before/after.
• Audit round: auth-leak test rewritten falsifiable (canary literal asserted absent from the marshaled struct, with a labeled post-hoc mutation proof it CAN fail); Config parameterization fixed TDD-first (pi-build resolves .pi/ through both entry points, RED captured before the fix); evidence counts corrected. Re-audit verdict: real, no issues.
• Gates: go build/vet/gofmt/test -count=1 + -race green; npm run check exit 0.

Risks

• A concurrent classic senpi writing settings is the sharpest edge — covered by the lockfile-replication design plus the race test; neo.theme isolation keeps classic behavior untouched.

Secret safety

No key material ever enters store structs (canary-guarded); no secrets in fixtures or evidence.

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Summary by cubic

Adds native Go readers for the ~/.senpi store and a lock-replicating settings write path so the neo TUI can read config and persist its skin safely without affecting classic behavior. Changes are additive and internal to packages/neo/internal/store, mirroring the classic TypeScript loaders.

• New Features
  • Agent dir resolution with Config (env override from AppName; defaults to <home>/.senpi/agent), supporting senpi and pi (.pi) builds.
  • Settings: load and deep-merge global + project (project wins); read neo.theme with fallback to classic theme; writer merges only neo.theme under the same <settings.json>.lock directory lock (retries + stale handling), never overwrites the file or touches classic theme; project scope respects ConfigDirName.
  • Sessions: scan safe-path cwd directories; parse header and entries from <timestamp>_<id>.jsonl; count messages, first user message, created/modified times; skip corrupt JSONL lines with warnings; handles very long lines.
  • Keybindings: read keybindings.json as action → keys (string or array of strings); malformed or mixed types are ignored; missing file yields defaults.
  • Models: read models.json (providers map + optional disabledProviders); missing file is OK; corrupt file returns an error.
  • Auth: expose provider → credential type only (api_key/oauth); never read or store key material (guarded by canary tests).
  • Themes: list custom themes from themes/ by inner "name"; non-JSON or nameless files are skipped.
  • Manual QA helpers: qaharness (sandbox scan/isolation) and writeqa (write-path receipt).

^{Written for commit 3aaf769. Summary will update on new commits.}

[gitguardian]

⚠️ GitGuardian has uncovered 1 secret following the scan of your pull request.

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🔎 Detected hardcoded secret in your pull request

GitGuardian id	GitGuardian status	Secret	Commit	Filename
34569191	Triggered	Generic High Entropy Secret	3aaf769	packages/neo/internal/store/auth_test.go	View secret

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