Framework-owned, domain-neutral authentication primitives for Askr. Requires Node.js 22 or newer.
| Entry | Owns | Does not own |
|---|---|---|
@askrjs/auth |
Principal, auth contexts and requirements, bearer/cookie/session request resolution |
Users, organizations, credential storage, password hashing |
@askrjs/auth/jwt |
RS256/ES256 issuance and validation, claims, JWKS rollover | Token persistence or revocation lists |
@askrjs/auth/oidc |
Discovery, authorization-code PKCE, callback correlation, verified ID-token-to-Principal exchange |
Provider UI, account linking, refresh-token storage |
@askrjs/auth/saml |
SP metadata and requests, signed/encrypted response validation, request correlation | IdP operation, SLO, IdP-initiated SAML, external CA trust policy |
@askrjs/auth/mfa |
TOTP, bounded CBOR/COSE, WebAuthn registration and authentication verification | Credential storage, recovery policy, enrollment UI |
Replay prevention stays with the application’s durable storage boundary. SAML requires atomic
requestStore.consume(). TOTP returns the accepted counter so it can be atomically marked used.
WebAuthn returns the verified new signature counter so it can be atomically persisted.
exchangeCode() accepts the callback and the stored authorization request separately. It checks
state before network access, then validates the required ID token against discovery and JWKS before
returning { tokens, principal }.
import { createOidcClient } from "@askrjs/auth/oidc";
const client = createOidcClient({ issuer, clientId, clientSecret, redirectUri });
const request = await client.createAuthorizationRequest();
const result = await client.exchangeCode({ code: callback.code, state: callback.state, request });import { generateTotpSecret, verifyTotpCode } from "@askrjs/auth/mfa";
const secret = generateTotpSecret();
const result = await verifyTotpCode({ secret, code });
if (result.valid) await counters.consume(result.counter); // application-owned atomic replay guardTOTP defaults to SHA-1, six digits, 30-second periods, and a one-step window. SHA-256, SHA-512,
and eight-digit codes are supported. WebAuthn uses exact base64url challenges, exact origin
allowlists, one RP ID, and user verification by default. It accepts ES256, RS256 (RSA 2048-bit or
larger), and EdDSA/Ed25519 keys. Registration accepts none and cryptographically verified packed
self-attestation only; certificate-backed attestation is deliberately rejected.
The server-only @askrjs/auth/saml entrypoint provides a narrow SP-initiated SAML 2.0 flow:
metadata generation, signed or unsigned HTTP-Redirect AuthnRequests, signed assertion validation,
optional signed responses, encrypted assertions, request correlation, and atomic replay protection.
It is intentionally separate from createAuth() and the package root.
import { createSamlServiceProvider } from "@askrjs/auth/saml";
const saml = createSamlServiceProvider({
entityId: "https://app.example.com/saml/metadata",
acsUrl: "https://app.example.com/saml/acs",
idp: { entityId: "https://idp.example.com", ssoUrl: "https://idp.example.com/sso", certificates: [idpCertificate] },
requestStore, // save/get plus an atomic consume operation
});
const { url } = await saml.createAuthnRequest({ relayState: "return-to" });
const principal = await saml.validateResponse({ samlResponse, relayState: "return-to" });The request store is a security boundary: consume(id) must atomically return false for a
missing, expired, or previously consumed ID. The validator defaults to a 10-minute request TTL,
a five-minute assertion age, and 60 seconds of clock skew. Assertions are always signed;
requireSignedResponse additionally requires the outer response signature.
JWT issuance and validation support RS256 with RSA keys and ES256 with EC P-256 keys. A JWK's
alg may be omitted and inferred from its key shape; when present, it must match the key.
npm install @askrjs/auth