Stop advertising unsupported RSA signatures in DTLS 1.2#157
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The parser already consumes and discards signature algorithms we don't support. The Sizing it from And I added a test. |
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Summary
Stop advertising RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-384 as supported DTLS 1.2 signature algorithms. Dimpl recognizes these wire values for parsing, but its signature implementations support only ECDSA.
Why
RSA support was removed from dimpl, but the DTLS 1.2
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm::supported()list still included RSA. That list feeds both the defaultsignature_algorithmsextension and server-sideCertificateRequestalgorithm selection.As a result, dimpl could advertise RSA to a peer even though it could not complete the corresponding signature verification. A peer selecting an advertised RSA algorithm could therefore cause the handshake to fail. The advertisement was also inconsistent with the ECDSA client certificate type requested by the server.
Changes
all()retains ECDSA and RSA values so incoming messages remain parseable.supported()now contains only ECDSA/SHA-256 and ECDSA/SHA-384.SignatureAndHashAlgorithmVecfrom the recognized set so parsing mixed ECDSA/RSA input remains bounded without losing recognized values.signature_algorithmsextension from the supported set.CertificateRequestsignature selection to algorithms supported by dimpl's verifiers.Testing
cargo fmt --all -- --checkcargo test --all-features