Naruon AI Email Workspace

Full-stack AI workspace with a FastAPI backend, Next.js frontend, vector search, AI summaries, hardened email threading, and relay/proxy contracts for external mail/calendar/file systems.

Quick Links

• Installation & Setup
• Architecture
• Contributing
• Code of Conduct
• Security Policy

North-star scope contract

• Naruon is not an SMTP server, IMAP server, MX host, or mailbox capacity provider. It is a web client/control plane that works through member-configured providers and customer-owned systems.
• Customer mail, CalDAV/CardDAV, and WebDAV accounts remain the source of truth; Naruon stores bounded metadata, indexes, preferences, and auditable action intent rather than replacing those systems.
• Private-network protocols use an outbound-only self-hosted connector to naruon.net; GitHub self-hosted runners are CI smoke infrastructure, not the production connector itself.
• Calendar/file/contact writeback is opt-in, server-authoritative, and conflict-aware through source capabilities, provenance, ETags/If-Match, and audit logs.
• Access control is universal RBAC plus ABAC: data-region, consent, workspace, group, source capability, and customer-policy denies take precedence over broad role allows. A permitted platform_admin can cross organization and resource ownership boundaries for platform operations, but not data-region or consent denies.
• Keycloak is the default enterprise OIDC evaluation target; Casdoor remains a lighter alternative. Traefik and OpenTelemetry are evaluated for edge policy and open-source observability.
• PR automation is metadata-only inside this repository and uses current-head robot-review evidence plus required checks. Human approval is not awaited by default under repo policy.
• OpenCode Review, Strix Security Scan, and PR Review Merge Scheduler are supplied by the ContextualWisdomLab central required workflows from ContextualWisdomLab/.github. This repository does not carry repo-local OpenCode, Strix, or merge-scheduler workflow copies; branch updates, auto-merge, and mechanical merge actions run as the target repository's github-actions[bot] through the central workflow. Pending CodeRabbit or required-check evidence is a wait state, not a hard blocker.
• Security governance is source-backed through signed /api/security/access-surface. The endpoint reads scoped WebDAV, CalDAV, and connector evidence plus durable security_audit_events, reuses the deny-first RBAC/ABAC policy engine, and returns no sequential account ids, browser-facing source/event/decision identifiers, provider-write execution flags, raw credentials, legacy unscoped audit rows, or fake security posture claims. HMAC fallback sessions are not accepted as authoritative workspace-membership evidence for this security posture surface; enterprise OIDC/JWKS or an explicit server-side membership path must establish the workspace boundary.
• Data quality is source-backed through signed /api/data/quality-surface. The endpoint summarizes scoped repositories, workspace documents, recent email-attachment file assets, ingestion inventory, embedding coverage, quality checks, and connector evidence from existing rows, returns provider_write_executed=false, and does not expose provider credentials, raw usernames, server URLs, message bodies, raw message/thread ids, or sequential ids. The Data workspace lets operators upload a signed-session workspace document, request document reparse, embedding regeneration intent, HWP conversion intent, and explicit WebDAV document materialization. The materialization route re-reads the selected document_id from the signed workspace, derives the provider path and Markdown content server-side, and dispatches write_webdav only when the caller explicitly requests execute_provider=true.
• Projects are source-backed through signed /api/webdav/folders and /api/tasks. The workspace derives project boundaries from customer-owned WebDAV folders, task progress from opaque public ticket ids, and labels provider writes as deferred intent work.
• Custom LLM provider base_url calls fail closed unless the host is exact-allowlisted, HTTPS-only, and resolved to global addresses. Runtime calls use a pinned-address httpx transport so DNS is not resolved a second time after validation.
• OIDC issuer and JWKS URLs follow the same outbound fetch posture: exact-allowlisted HTTPS hosts must resolve only to global addresses, and JWKS preload fetches connect to the validated pinned address while keeping TLS/SNI on the allowlisted hostname.
• Session authority is assigned by the verified HMAC or OIDC code path, not by a _session_verifier JWT payload claim supplied inside the token.

Agentic Ontology & Auto-Organization

• Sender ontology: The backend classifies sender relationships and returns a deterministic next-action hint, such as reply/task tracking for colleagues or summary-first handling for newsletters. Relationship graph reads can be filtered by source message/thread ids so the Search workspace can show the sender DAG beside the originating mail context. If no relationship exists for the selected search result, the browser can call signed /api/ontology/relationships/capture-source; the backend re-reads the source email under owner/organization scope and derives the thread provenance server-side before storing the relationship.
• Self-sent knowledge capture: IMAP-imported emails sent from a user to the same address now create one idempotent, source-linked self_sent_knowledge ticket task with a plain-text memo title. The Tasks workspace can request a signed WebDAV/Notes materialization intent for that task and shows the planned customer-owned target with provider_write_executed=false; connector-side WebDAV/CalDAV PUT adapters now enforce If-Match, and execute_provider=true dispatches the signed materialization command to an active outbound runner. Durable retry queues and extended execution audit workflows remain future work.
• Pending reply dashboard: the Today dashboard reads signed /api/emails/pending-replies?limit=3 data and shows sent-mail reply waits in Home KPIs and judgment points. Pending replies are calculated from customer-owned mailbox metadata; Naruon does not host the mailbox or fabricate provider writes.
• Overdue reply follow-up: Home and Tasks can call signed POST /api/tasks/reply-sla-escalations to convert overdue pending sent-mail replies into opaque, source-linked reply_sla ticket tasks. Escalation reuses server-side reply tracking, keeps generated titles plain text, and does not mutate the customer's email provider.

Five-minute local path

cp .env.example .env
python3 - <<'PY'
from pathlib import Path
import base64
import secrets

env_path = Path(".env")
env_values = {}
for line in env_path.read_text().splitlines():
    if "=" not in line or line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
        continue
    key, value = line.split("=", 1)
    env_values[key] = value

db_password = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
env_values.update(
    {
        "POSTGRES_DB": "ai_email",
        "POSTGRES_USER": "naruon_local",
        "POSTGRES_PASSWORD": db_password,
        "DATABASE_URL": (
            "postgresql+asyncpg://naruon_local:"
            f"{db_password}@localhost:5432/ai_email"
        ),
        "AUTH_SESSION_HMAC_SECRET": secrets.token_urlsafe(48),
        "ENCRYPTION_KEY": base64.urlsafe_b64encode(secrets.token_bytes(32)).decode(),
    }
)

existing_lines = env_path.read_text().splitlines()
existing_keys = {
    line.split("=", 1)[0]
    for line in existing_lines
    if "=" in line and not line.lstrip().startswith("#")
}
required_lines = [f"{key}={value}" for key, value in env_values.items() if key not in existing_keys]
env_path.write_text("\n".join(existing_lines + required_lines) + "\n")
PY
./scripts/naruon_compose.sh up -d --build
./scripts/naruon_compose.sh exec backend python import_fixtures.py
curl -s http://localhost:8000/api/emails
python3 -m webbrowser http://localhost:3000

Apple Silicon / MLX local path (OS별 로컬 API 모델 서버 사용)

기본 docker-compose.yml는 Linux Ollama 컨테이너를 그대로 유지합니다. Apple Silicon 로컬 실 테스트(또는 외부 MLX/OpenAI-compatible 서비스)만 분리하려면 임시 오버라이드 파일을 붙여 실행합니다.

# 다음 블록은 로컬 실사용 검증용 샘플입니다. 민감한 쿼리로 대체할 수 있지만,
# 현재 실검증에서는 아래 두 키워드로 테스트합니다.
cat > .env.mlx <<'EOF'

# 기존 보안값은 그대로 두고, 로컬 모델 경로만 오버라이드
OPENAI_API_KEY=mlx
ALLOWED_LLM_BASE_URL_HOSTS=localhost,127.0.0.1,host.docker.internal
ALLOW_LOCAL_LLM_PROVIDERS=true
OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://host.docker.internal:11434/v1
OPENAI_EMBEDDING_MODEL=embeddinggemma
OPENAI_MODEL=gemma4:e2b-it-qat
# 포트 충돌이 있으면 아래 두 값으로 변경
NARUON_FRONTEND_HOST_PORT=127.0.0.1:3000
NARUON_BACKEND_HOST_PORT=127.0.0.1:8000
# Linux에서만 host-gateway가 필요합니다.
NARUON_MLX_EXTRA_HOSTS=host-gateway
NARUON_MLX_ALLOWED_LLM_BASE_URL_HOSTS=localhost,127.0.0.1,host.docker.internal
NARUON_MLX_OPENAI_API_KEY=mlx
NARUON_MLX_BASE_URL=http://host.docker.internal:11434/v1
NARUON_MLX_EMBEDDING_MODEL=embeddinggemma
NARUON_MLX_LLM_MODEL=gemma4:e2b-it-qat
EOF

# 로컬에서만 쓰는 compose 오버라이드는 임시 파일로 만들고 커밋하지 않습니다.
# OS 분기 없이 환경변수 하나로 host.docker.internal 매핑을 제어합니다.
# Linux에서 host-gateway가 필요한 환경이면 .env.mlx에서 NARUON_MLX_EXTRA_HOSTS를 덮어씁니다.
# Apple Silicon 검증 기준: 백엔드는 host.docker.internal:11434의 MLX(OpenAI-compatible)
# 엔드포인트로 바로 연결해 Ollama 컨테이너 의존을 피합니다.
mlx_compose_override="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/docker-compose.mlx.XXXXXX.yml")"
cat > "$mlx_compose_override" <<'EOF'
services:
  backend:
    depends_on:
      db:
        condition: service_healthy
    environment:
      ALLOW_LOCAL_LLM_PROVIDERS: "true"
      ALLOWED_LLM_BASE_URL_HOSTS: ${NARUON_MLX_ALLOWED_LLM_BASE_URL_HOSTS:-localhost,127.0.0.1,host.docker.internal}
      OPENAI_API_KEY: ${NARUON_MLX_OPENAI_API_KEY:-mlx}
      OPENAI_BASE_URL: ${NARUON_MLX_BASE_URL:-http://host.docker.internal:11434/v1}
      OPENAI_EMBEDDING_MODEL: ${NARUON_MLX_EMBEDDING_MODEL:-embeddinggemma}
      OPENAI_MODEL: ${NARUON_MLX_LLM_MODEL:-gemma4:e2b-it-qat}
    extra_hosts:
      - "host.docker.internal:${NARUON_MLX_EXTRA_HOSTS:-host.docker.internal}"
    ports:
      - "${NARUON_BACKEND_HOST_PORT:-127.0.0.1:8000}:8000"
  frontend:
    ports:
      - "${NARUON_FRONTEND_HOST_PORT:-127.0.0.1:3000}:3000"
EOF

NARUON_ENV_FILE=.env.mlx \
docker compose --env-file .env.mlx -f docker-compose.yml -f "$mlx_compose_override" up -d --build

# 혹시 모델 엔드포인트 미노출이 있을 경우는 위 명령 직전에 로컬 MLX 서버/게이트웨이를
# 먼저 확인합니다. (호스트는 본인 환경별로 달라질 수 있음)
curl -sf http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1/models >/dev/null && \
  echo "MLX/OpenAI-compatible server is reachable" || \
  echo "MLX endpoint is not reachable on 127.0.0.1:11434"

실 메일 임포트 + 요약/초안 검증:

# 아래 두 --query는 실 사용자 공개 테스트 키워드입니다.
MAIL_DIR="/Users/seonghobae/Library/Mobile Documents/com~apple~CloudDocs/Downloads/mail"
if [ ! -r "$MAIL_DIR" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: cannot read $MAIL_DIR (Apple CloudDocs 권한 또는 path 접근 권한 점검 필요)"
  echo "대체: 실 메일 파일을 별도 로컬 폴더에 복사한 뒤 MAIL_DIR을 교체해 재실행"
  exit 1
fi

AUTH_SESSION_HMAC_SECRET="$(grep -E '^AUTH_SESSION_HMAC_SECRET=' .env | cut -d= -f2-)"
python3 backend/scripts/private_mail_http_smoke.py \
  --mail-dir "$MAIL_DIR" \
  --base-url http://127.0.0.1:3000 \
  --frontend-base-url http://127.0.0.1:3000 \
  --api-base-url http://127.0.0.1:8000 \
  --session-secret "$AUTH_SESSION_HMAC_SECRET" \
  --query "중공업 전력PU 회의록" \
  --query "중공업 기전PU 회의록" \
  --match-mode all-terms \
  --limit 20 \
  --batch-size 6 \
  --require-browser-visible \
  --llm-smoke \
  --print-session-token

--print-session-token이 켜진 경우 스크립트가 같은 토큰을 브라우저로 전파하는 /auth/session 호출 예시를 출력합니다. 위 출력의 JS 한 줄을 앱 콘솔에서 실행하면 naruon_session 쿠키가 갱신되어 API로 임포트한 메일이 브라우저와 동일 세션에서 보입니다. session_check=ok 로그는 세션 클레임이 브라우저에서 확인되었음을 뜻하고, session_check=failed(...)는 토큰 검증/클레임 파싱 문제가 있음을 뜻합니다. --require-browser-visible은 동일 토큰을 Cookie: naruon_session=...로 주입해 /api/emails 응답을 조회해 브라우저 프록시 경로까지 반영 확인이 되도록 합니다.

동기화 지연이 큰 환경에서는 재시도 옵션을 조정할 수 있습니다.

  --search-retry-attempts 5 \
  --search-retry-delay-seconds 1.2 \
  --inbox-retry-attempts 5 \
  --inbox-retry-delay-seconds 1.2

실제 브라우저 검증 순서:

1. 브라우저에서 http://127.0.0.1:3000 접속 후 "/mail"로 이동
2. 방금 입력한 키워드 중 하나로 검색
3. /mail 결과 목록에서 임포트된 메일을 열어 상세가 정상 표시되는지 확인
4. 동일 이메일 상세 화면에서 요약/초안 버튼이 작동하고(llm=ok, draft=ok 또는 UI 동작), 브라우저 세션 값(session_check=ok)이 스크립트 출력에 남아있는지 확인
   • 브라우저에서 동일 이메일을 선택한 뒤 LLM 요약/초안 버튼 동작 확인
5. 세션 불일치 의심 시 session_check=failed(...) 또는 session_check=skipped(...)가 출력되면 --print-session-token의 콘솔 스니펫을 다시 실행하고 새로고침 후 2~4단계를 반복

실행 전 체크(빠른 사전 진단):

# Podman/Docker 런타임 연결 확인
podman system connection ls

# MLX(OpenAI-compatible) 엔드포인트 노출 확인
curl -sf http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1/models | head

# 기존 웹 서비스(Nginx/프록시)가 3000/8000/11434를 가로채고 있지 않은지 확인
lsof -iTCP:3000 -sTCP:LISTEN
lsof -iTCP:8000 -sTCP:LISTEN
lsof -iTCP:11434 -sTCP:LISTEN

백엔드 API를 바로 확인하려면(필요 시):

curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/emails?limit=10
# 아래는 동일 샘플로 API 직접 점검하는 예시입니다.
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/search \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"query": "중공업 전력PU 회의록", "limit": 3}'

세션이 다르게 보이면 /auth/session 동기화 콘솔 코드를 다시 실행한 뒤 새로고침 합니다.

What you should see: the fixture import loads a three-message Quarterly plan conversation. /api/emails returns one threaded inbox item with reply_count greater than 1, and the frontend shows conversation history oldest to newest. First-run frontend sessions open the Today execution dashboard by default, with explicit entry points to the email workspace and calendar-first workspace.

The fixture importer uses real OpenAI embeddings only when OPENAI_API_KEY is set. With the default empty key it writes local zero-vector embeddings so the threading proof path works offline.

Backend settings read environment variables first, then .env, ../.env, and ~/.env. DATABASE_URL, AUTH_SESSION_HMAC_SECRET, and ENCRYPTION_KEY still have no code defaults; Compose and Kubernetes must inject them explicitly before runtime. docker compose build backend frontend is intentionally allowed to parse without local secrets because image builds do not need database or session credentials. docker compose up still fails closed inside the database/backend startup path when POSTGRES_PASSWORD, AUTH_SESSION_HMAC_SECRET, or ENCRYPTION_KEY are missing. For Compose, ./scripts/naruon_compose.sh reads ${NARUON_ENV_FILE} when set, otherwise uses ~/.env if present, and falls back to the project .env. It passes that file to Docker Compose only as an interpolation source so the backend service receives the whitelisted variables in docker-compose*.yml, not every local secret present in ~/.env. The backend image starts through python scripts/start_backend.py, which checks the same required settings before uvicorn imports the app. A direct docker run therefore still needs explicit environment injection through --env, an orchestrator secret, or a minimal Naruon-specific env file containing only the backend settings needed by the container.

Manual development path

Backend:

cd backend
python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
python3 scripts/migrate_db.py
python3 -m pytest -q
uvicorn main:app --reload

Frontend:

cd frontend
npm install
npm test
npm run lint
npm run build
npm run dev

next.config.ts applies a best-effort local guard for build worker fan-out and static generation concurrency (NEXT_BUILD_CPUS=2, NEXT_STATIC_GENERATION_MAX_CONCURRENCY=2, NEXT_STATIC_GENERATION_MIN_PAGES_PER_WORKER=50) so constrained CI/build machines do not fan out excessive Node/PostCSS workers. Treat the Next.js CPU knob as experimental and enforce authoritative limits through CI, Docker, or the runner. Raise those values only with explicit build evidence.

Threading proof points

• Canonical thread IDs are assigned in backend/services/threading_service.py.
• Parser output preserves raw Message-ID, In-Reply-To, References, and Reply-To headers.
• Importers persist the canonical service-assigned thread_id; they do not recompute their own thread IDs.
• Signed email file imports accept .eml, .zip, and .mbox uploads through /api/emails/import-files; imported email and attachment vectors use the active organization embedding model such as local embeddinggemma when an LLM provider is configured.
• Duplicate ZIP/forward candidates can be checked through signed /api/emails/unique-thread-intent. The intent uses normalized Message-ID and strong body fingerprint matches, returns canonical thread metadata, and does not execute provider writes or irreversible DB merges.
• IMAP imports store the strong body fingerprint when message body content is available, preserving the older lightweight fingerprint only as a fallback.
• Subject-only Fwd: or Re: matching is not a valid duplicate/thread merge signal. Forwarded threading must come from Message-ID, References, In-Reply-To, or future persisted duplicate provenance.
• Replies include In-Reply-To and References headers in the send payload.
• Development sends are explicit simulations unless a real SMTP path is wired.

API smoke examples

The backend accepts only signed bearer sessions. For local smoke tests, generate a local-only AUTH_SESSION_HMAC_SECRET, start the API with that exact value, and then mint a short-lived fixture token from the same shell:

export AUTH_SESSION_HMAC_SECRET="$(python3 - <<'PY'
import secrets

print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))
PY
)"
export NARUON_DEV_BEARER="$(python3 - <<'PY'
import base64, hashlib, hmac, json, os, time

secret = os.environ["AUTH_SESSION_HMAC_SECRET"].encode()
payload = {
    "ver": 1,
    "iss": "naruon-control-plane",
    "aud": "naruon-api",
    "sub": "default",
    "role": "organization_admin",
    "org": "default",
    "groups": [],
    "workspace": "default",
    "exp": int(time.time()) + 300,
}
enc = lambda raw: base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b"=").decode()
header = enc(json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}).encode())
body = enc(json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True).encode())
sig = enc(hmac.new(secret, f"{header}.{body}".encode(), hashlib.sha256).digest())
print(f"{header}.{body}.{sig}")
PY
)"

curl -s http://localhost:8000/api/emails \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER" \
  | jq '.emails[] | {subject, thread_id, reply_count}'
curl -s http://localhost:8000/api/emails/thread/[email protected] \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER" \
  | jq '.thread[] | {message_id, in_reply_to, references}'

# Requires a tenant OpenAI key because search generates a query embedding.
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/search \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER" \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"query":"Quarterly plan"}'

# Send remains honest in local/dev mode: missing SMTP config returns 400.
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/emails/send \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER" \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"to":"[email protected]","subject":"Re: Quarterly plan","body":"Thanks"}'

# Convert email-derived execution items into source-linked ticket tasks.
TASK_BODY="$(cat <<'JSON'
{
  "source_email_id": "<[email protected]>",
  "thread_id": "[email protected]",
  "items": ["담당자 확인"]
}
JSON
)"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/tasks/from-email \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER" \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d "$TASK_BODY"

# Request a customer-owned calendar writeback intent. This selects a trusted
# server-side source and returns no provider secret. Provider execution is
# explicit opt-in and requires If-Match/ETag evidence.
curl -s http://localhost:8000/api/calendar/writeback-sources \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/calendar/writeback-intent \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER" \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"action":"update","summary":"담당자 확인 회의","target_source_id":"caldav-primary","execute_provider":true}'

# Review source-backed Security governance without exposing provider secrets.
curl -s http://localhost:8000/api/security/access-surface \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER" \
  | jq '{scope_kind, sources, policy_decisions}'

# Review source-backed Data repository, ingestion, embedding, and quality state.
curl -s http://localhost:8000/api/data/quality-surface \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER" \
  | jq '{workspace_id, audit_event, repositories, quality_checks}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/data/documents \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER" \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"document_name":"decision-note.md","document_type":"text/markdown","document_content":"# Decision note"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8000/api/data/documents/doc_example/reparse \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $NARUON_DEV_BEARER"

Error-message contract

Errors should tell a contributor what failed and avoid leaking internals:

• SMTP not configured: 400 {"detail":"SMTP is not configured"}. Create a tenant config with SMTP host, port, and username before testing real send.
• Local simulated send: {"status":"simulated","simulated":true}. Treat as payload/header verification only, not delivery proof.
• Search without OpenAI key: 400 {"detail":"OpenAI API key not configured"}. Add a tenant OpenAI key or skip search smoke locally.
• Search backend failure: 500 {"detail":"Search failed"}. Check backend logs; raw exceptions are intentionally not returned to clients.
• Missing thread: 404 {"detail":"Thread not found"}. Re-import fixtures or verify the URL uses the normalized thread id.
• Task creation from a missing or unauthorized source email: 404 {"detail":"Source email not found"}.
• Task creation without usable execution items: 422 {"detail":"At least one execution item is required"}.
• Calendar writeback with no trusted customer-owned CalDAV/CardDAV/WebDAV source: 422 {"detail":"No customer-owned writeback source is available"}. The frontend must show this as a writeback-intent failure, not as a completed provider calendar write.

Current scope contract

Runtime auth no longer trusts public X-User-*, X-Organization-*, X-Group-*, or X-Dev-Auth-Token headers. Email rows now carry a nullable user_id owner key, and email/search/network graph endpoints scope reads to the authenticated user. Local bootstrap and fixture imports default that owner to default; production multi-user use still needs a verified OIDC provider plus an audited mailbox-owner migration/backfill before real tenant data is mixed.

The current frontend shell now exposes the north-star workspace map in the primary and mobile menus: Today dashboard, Mail, Calendar, Tasks, Projects, Context Search, AI Hub, Data, Security, and Settings. The /mail, /search, /tasks, /calendar, /projects, /ai-hub, /data, /security, and /settings destinations must render real work-detail surfaces rather than static placeholder copy: calendar month/week/detail/coordination and CalDAV writeback queues, ticket task boards and source-linked details, integrated search result/detail graph timelines, source-backed project folders and decision-evidence logs, document repository/ingestion/embedding/quality queues, security dashboards and policy screens, and operational settings. Provider write execution and enterprise identity remain future connector/auth slices until source-backed integrations exist. Browser writes to signed backend routes use the HttpOnly naruon_session cookie; the same-origin Next.js /api/* proxy converts that server-readable cookie into the backend Authorization: Bearer session and strips public identity headers such as X-User-Id and X-Organization-Id, including group and dev-token variants, rather than forwarding development identity fallbacks. Settings connected-account workflow reads and saves /api/accounts/config through the same signed-session path and scopes provider settings by the signed user_id + organization_id owner. It displays SMTP, IMAP, POP3, OAuth, CalDAV/CardDAV, and WebDAV readiness from masked account fields and source registry APIs, preserves stored credential secrets when the user leaves replacement fields blank, and keeps Naruon framed as a web client/relay proxy rather than an email host. Settings also exposes organization-admin self-hosted connector token rotation through /api/runner-config/rotate; the one-time token is shown only after rotation and is not included in the connector manifest. Mail worker logs and raised errors use generic account-configuration wording for missing POP3 credentials so operational logs do not reveal credential-type details.

Email-derived work is tracked through /api/tasks/from-email. Created ticket tasks retain an internal source-email foreign key, expose source message/thread provenance, sanitize NUL bytes from LLM/email-derived titles, and return opaque public task ids instead of exposing database integer surrogates. The new ticket_tasks table keeps database names two-word snake_case such as task_id, task_title, status_code, and priority_code.

Calendar actions in EmailDetail now request /api/calendar/writeback-intent for each extracted execution item and display the selected trusted source provenance. Calendar source selection now reads opaque calendar_writeback_sources.source_uid rows instead of exposing sequential CalDAV account ids, and the Calendar workspace loads those rows through signed /api/calendar/writeback-sources before posting an opaque target_source_id. The workspace now presents those sources as explicit selectable writeback targets and shows the selected source ETag/capability state before intent creation. Provider execution is opt-in through execute_provider=true; the API dispatches a signed write_caldav command to an active outbound runner only after server-authoritative source selection and If-Match evidence are available. The browser no longer claims /api/calendar/sync success from the mail-detail action path; direct browser provider writes stay deferred. Connector-side DAV adapters can execute ETag/If-Match-guarded PUTs, and the WebDAV materialization endpoint can dispatch signed commands to an active outbound runner. Durable queueing, retry, and broader UI dispatch controls remain connector workflow follow-ups. WebDAV writeback and self-sent knowledge materialization use webdav_accounts.source_uid as the browser-visible source id, scope lookup by the signed session organization, honor persisted writeback_enabled eligibility, surface webdav_accounts.etag_value as source-safe If-Match evidence, reject legacy target_account_id payloads, and keep sequential account_id values internal-only. The Data workspace exposes the WebDAV source as an explicit selected target and treats 409 If-Match/ETag responses as conflicts instead of generic failures, so UI copy never implies a provider write overwrote customer-owned files. Provider URLs, usernames, and credentials stay server-side. Project folder listings are scoped by the signed session organization and expose opaque project_folders.folder_uid values instead of sequential folder_id values, and the /dav PUT skeleton fails closed until provider-backed source, capability, and ETag/If-Match checks exist. Data repository, ingestion, embedding, and quality status is loaded from signed /api/data/quality-surface. Workspace document uploads use signed POST /api/data/documents, while reparse, embedding-regeneration, and HWP conversion controls call the scoped document action endpoints and keep provider_write_executed=false. Workspace document WebDAV materialization uses signed POST /api/data/documents/{document_id}/webdav-materialization-intent with an opaque selected WebDAV source_uid; the backend derives the target path and content server-side and dispatches connector execution only on execute_provider=true. The UI must not reintroduce static ingestion logs, fake vector counts, unsupported embedding model names, fake quality totals, or inert permanent ready-soon controls; use source-backed rows or explicit pending states.

Operations and release docs

• docs/operations/release-deployment-architecture.md: release, CI, GHCR, and live E2E evidence path.
• docs/operations/open-source-apm.md: OpenTelemetry, Prometheus, Grafana, Loki, Tempo/Jaeger adoption plan. Settings calls signed /api/observability/operational-signals to show server-observed connector registration, active runner connection state, recent durable heartbeat history, Prometheus, and OpenTelemetry configuration while provider execution remains future connector work.
• docs/operations/email-relay-proxy-boundary.md: Naruon is a web client relay/proxy, not an email server.
• docs/operations/source-of-truth-and-writeback-sovereignty.md: customer-owned source-of-truth, connector, writeback, and audit rules.
• docs/operations/postgresql-physical-replication.md: physical replication, WAL, restore, and read-routing plan.
• docs/operations/auth-key-management.md: auth boundary, Fernet key management, and Keycloak/Casdoor evaluation.
• docs/operations/traefik-evaluation.md: Traefik versus current NGINX ingress evaluation.
• docs/development/merge-gate-policy.md: metadata-only PR governance, current-head CodeRabbit evidence, and required-check behavior.

Verification used for this hardening pass

./scripts/verify_threading.sh

# Equivalent manual checks:
cd backend && python3 -m pytest -q
cd frontend && npm test && npm run lint && npm run build

Additional focused checks for the current workspace/task/governance slice:

cd backend && \
  PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 DISABLE_BACKGROUND_WORKERS=1 \
  pytest tests/test_tasks_api.py -q
cd frontend && npm test -- \
  src/lib/api-client.test.ts \
  src/lib/workspace-preferences.test.ts \
  src/components/DashboardLayout.test.tsx \
  src/app/calendar/page.test.tsx \
  src/app/tasks/page.test.tsx \
  src/app/search/page.test.tsx \
  src/app/projects/page.test.tsx \
  src/app/data/page.test.tsx \
  src/app/security/page.test.tsx \
  src/app/page.test.tsx \
  src/components/EmailDetail.test.tsx
cd frontend && LIVE_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18081 npm run test:e2e -- tests/e2e/dashboard-branding.spec.ts
bash scripts/ci/test_pr_governance_gate.sh

Known local warnings: backend tests emit dependency/toolchain deprecation warnings from Starlette multipart and compiled SWIG metadata. They are not caused by threading code.

Phase 10 development rules

• Stepwise execution: Each phase requires an atomic PR, GitHub PR Tracking, Push, and Robot Review. A phase only ends when merged. Do not proceed without merge.
• TDD + DDD: Practice TDD, micro TDD, nano TDD, Domain Driven Development, and Context Driven Development.
• API Wiring: Always work with API wiring completed.
• Collaboration: Respect other agents' concurrent work; do not overwrite or dismiss unfamiliar changes.
• Subagent Delegation: Actively delegate tasks to Subagents.
• UI/Browser Testing: Use a real browser for testing (do not rely on assumptions).
• Strict Errors: Treat Timeout, Fatal, Warn, and Denied outputs as hard failures.
• Goal: Actively manage tasks to ensure open PR counts converge to 0.