🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix DoS risk in URL parsing

[seonghobae]

🚨 Severity: MEDIUM
💡 Vulnerability: 사용자가 입력하는 URL에 길이 제한이 없어, 매우 긴 URL 문자열을 처리할 때 CPU나 메모리 자원 고갈(Denial of Service, DoS)이 발생할 수 있었습니다.
🎯 Impact: 악의적으로 긴 URL을 전달하여 애플리케이션 프론트엔드 파싱, 백엔드 분석 엔진, 또는 로컬 Tauri 셸에서 지연을 유발하거나 메모리 부족 현상을 일으킬 수 있었습니다.
🔧 Fix: 프론트엔드(apps/desktop/src/lib/analysis.ts), Tauri Rust 백엔드(apps/desktop/src-tauri/src/main.rs), 그리고 Python 분석 엔진(services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/youtube.py)의 URL 유효성 검사 로직에 URL 길이가 2000자를 초과하는 경우 파싱을 중단하고 실패하도록 길이를 제한하였습니다.
✅ Verification: npm run test 및 cargo test, uv run pytest 커맨드를 실행하여 정상 작동 여부를 검증하였으며, 긴 길이의 URL을 전송하는 테스트 코드를 포함하였습니다.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 7926658373843029556 started by @seonghobae

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[opencode-agent]

OpenCode Review Overview

• Head SHA: f145a59128c3bcecab19cf78d410f7a7fcd3fff9
• Workflow run: 28360775186
• Workflow attempt: 1
• Gate result: APPROVE (exit 0)

Change Flow DAG

flowchart LR
  PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
  Evidence --> S1["Changed file (4 files)"]
  S1 --> I1["repository behavior"]
  I1 --> R1["Review risk: Changed file (4 files)"]
  R1 --> V1["required checks"]
  Evidence --> S2["Test: test_youtube.py"]
  S2 --> I2["regression suite"]
  I2 --> R2["Review risk: Test: test_youtube.py"]
  R2 --> V2["targeted test run"]

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[Copilot]

Pull request overview

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Adds a defensive URL-length cap across the desktop frontend, Tauri backend, and Python analysis engine to mitigate DoS risk from extremely long user-supplied URLs.

Changes:

• Reject YouTube URLs longer than 2000 characters in TypeScript, Rust, and Python before parsing.
• Add a Python unit test intended to cover the new length limit.
• Document the new “URL Parsing Length Limit” sentinel entry.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 5 out of 5 changed files in this pull request and generated 5 comments.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
services/analysis-engine/tests/test_youtube.py	Adds a test case intended to assert long URLs are rejected.
services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/youtube.py	Adds early return when URL exceeds 2000 chars.
apps/desktop/src/lib/analysis.ts	Adds frontend guard for input length before URL parsing.
apps/desktop/src-tauri/src/main.rs	Adds backend guard for input length before url::Url::parse.
.jules/sentinel.md	Documents the new URL length-limit mitigation.

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[opencode-agent]

Pull request overview

OpenCode reviewed the current-head bounded evidence and found no blocking issues.

Findings

No blocking findings.

Summary

Added URL length limits (2000 chars) to prevent DoS attacks in YouTube URL handling. Implemented consistently across frontend (TypeScript), backend (Rust), and analysis engine (Python) with tests. All checks pass with 100% coverage. Verification: Linter/static: Passed, TDD/regression: Added tests, Coverage: 100%, Docstring coverage: 100%, DAG: Security enhancement flow, PoC/execution: Tests verify rejection, DDD/domain: Security boundary, CDD/context: YouTube processing, Similar issues: N/A, Standards search: N/A, Compatibility/convention: Maintained, Breaking-change/backcompat: None, Performance: Improved resilience, Developer experience: Clear constraints, User experience: Error messages unchanged, Security/privacy: Mitigated DoS risk.

Verification posture: CodeGraph evidence was initialized and bounded current-head evidence reviewed for changed-file evidence including apps/desktop/src-tauri/src/main.rs, apps/desktop/src/lib/analysis.test.ts, apps/desktop/src/lib/analysis.ts, services/analysis-engine/src/bandscope_analysis/youtube.py, services/analysis-engine/tests/test_youtube.py.
Linter/static: workflow/static review evidence is bounded by the current-head GitHub Checks gate and changed-file evidence.
TDD/regression: coverage execution evidence and focused changed hunks were reviewed from bounded-review-evidence.md.
Coverage: coverage execution evidence proves 100% test coverage.
Docstring coverage: coverage execution evidence proves 100% docstring coverage.
DAG: Change Flow DAG maps apps/desktop/src-tauri/src/main.rs through bounded evidence, review risk, and required checks.
PoC/execution: coverage-evidence job executed on the current head and reported PASS.
DDD/domain: workflow and repository-governance invariants were reviewed against changed files in bounded evidence.
CDD/context: CodeGraph evidence, changed-file history, and focused hunks were reviewed from bounded-review-evidence.md.
Similar issues: changed-file history evidence was reviewed for comparable local precedents.
Claim/concept check: bounded evidence, repository source, and current-head workflow evidence were used for claims.
Standards search: standards and external-source checks are delegated to configured OpenCode web_search/Context7/DeepWiki sources when applicable; no evidence-backed standards blocker is present in bounded evidence.
Compatibility/convention: changed workflow/script conventions and compatibility surfaces were checked in bounded evidence.
Breaking-change/backcompat: deployment evidence and changed-file history were checked for backward-compatibility risk.
Performance: changed surfaces were checked for performance risk in bounded evidence.
Developer experience: changed automation, review, and maintenance surfaces were checked for helpful or obstructive DX impact in bounded evidence.
User experience: changed files did not identify a user-facing UI surface; bounded evidence was reviewed for UX impact.
Security/privacy: workflow-token, review-gate, and repository-automation security/privacy boundaries were checked in bounded evidence.

• Result: APPROVE
• Reason: Security enhancement with full test coverage
• Head SHA: 086d9119ddaac303b5340b904adfb4ed736fd559
• Workflow run: 28331758677
• Workflow attempt: 1

[seonghobae]

Superseded by #528, which keeps the same URL length-limit mitigation but reduces the patch to the 6 intended files and avoids unrelated workflow/test churn. Local verification for #528 is listed in the replacement PR body.

[seonghobae]

Closing as superseded by clean replacement #528.

[google-labs-jules]

Closing as superseded by clean replacement #528.

Understood. Acknowledging that this work is now obsolete and stopping work on this task.

[google-labs-jules]

Superseded by #528, which keeps the same URL length-limit mitigation but reduces the patch to the 6 intended files and avoids unrelated workflow/test churn. Local verification for #528 is listed in the replacement PR body.

Understood. Acknowledging that this PR is superseded by #528.