diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index 9133bba1..7039d665 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -22,3 +22,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) / Local File Inclusion
 **Learning:** Functions that fetch URLs provided via user inputs (e.g., `wait_for_url` fetching `--backend-ready-url` in CI scripts) can inadvertently read local files if they do not validate the scheme. Python's `urllib.request.urlopen` supports `file://` schemes, allowing attackers to access arbitrary file contents from the host machine or sandbox if they can control the URL parameter.
 **Prevention:** Always validate URL inputs to restrict allowed schemes. Check that URLs explicitly start with `http://` or `https://` before fetching them with standard libraries like `urllib`.
+## 2026-07-03 - Prevent SSRF via URL Scheme Validation
+**Vulnerability:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) / Local File Inclusion
+**Learning:** External URL fetching with `urllib.request.urlopen` (like API endpoints passed via environment variables) can accept schemes like `file://` implicitly, which could allow arbitrary file reading or internal network scanning if the environment is misconfigured or manipulated.
+**Prevention:** Always validate that URLs explicitly start with `http://` or `https://` before using them in standard library requests. Append  to suppress linter warnings only after verifying the input is validated.
diff --git a/scripts/ci/noema_review_gate.py b/scripts/ci/noema_review_gate.py
index 1e4661b7..93fda3b2 100644
--- a/scripts/ci/noema_review_gate.py
+++ b/scripts/ci/noema_review_gate.py
@@ -268,6 +268,9 @@ def call_llm(repo: str, number: int, pr: dict[str, Any], diff: str, truncated: b
         print("Noema LLM review unavailable: NOEMA_LLM_API_URL or NOEMA_LLM_API_KEY is not configured.")
         return None
 
+    if not (api_url.startswith("http://") or api_url.startswith("https://")):
+        raise ValueError(f"NOEMA_LLM_API_URL must start with http:// or https:// to prevent SSRF vulnerabilities, got: {api_url}")
+
     prompt = {
         "role": "user",
         "content": "\n".join(
@@ -304,7 +307,7 @@ def call_llm(repo: str, number: int, pr: dict[str, Any], diff: str, truncated: b
         },
         method="POST",
     )
-    with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=120) as response:
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=120) as response:  # nosec B310
         raw = response.read().decode("utf-8")
     data = json.loads(raw)
     content = (((data.get("choices") or [{}])[0].get("message") or {}).get("content") or "").strip()
diff --git a/tests/test_noema_review_gate.py b/tests/test_noema_review_gate.py
index 0b333ab3..835d1918 100644
--- a/tests/test_noema_review_gate.py
+++ b/tests/test_noema_review_gate.py
@@ -198,6 +198,11 @@ def test_call_llm_handles_configuration_and_verdicts(monkeypatch):
     monkeypatch.delenv("NOEMA_LLM_API_KEY", raising=False)
     assert noema.call_llm("owner/repo", 1, pr, "diff", False) is None
 
+    monkeypatch.setenv("NOEMA_LLM_API_URL", "file:///etc/passwd")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("NOEMA_LLM_API_KEY", "secret")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must start with http:// or https://"):
+        noema.call_llm("owner/repo", 1, pr, "diff", False)
+
     monkeypatch.setenv("NOEMA_LLM_API_URL", "https://llm.example.test/chat")
     monkeypatch.setenv("NOEMA_LLM_API_KEY", "secret")
     monkeypatch.setenv("NOEMA_LLM_MODEL", "review-model")